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WALDBURGER v. CTS CORPORATION: ENSURING THE 
PLAINTIFF’S DAY IN COURT AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 
JESS KYLE∗ 
In Waldburger v. CTS Corporation,1 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit held that the Federally Required Commence-
ment Date (“FRCD”) provision2 of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 19803 (“CERCLA”) preempted 
North Carolina’s ten-year statute of repose4 for real property claims.5  The 
plaintiffs were thus empowered to bring their nuisance claims under state 
law against a manufacturer allegedly responsible for contamination of their 
properties with hazardous substances.6  The Waldburger court characterized 
the case as primarily a matter of statutory interpretation,7 albeit in the con-
text of preemption, and both the majority and dissent performed the same 
two-step interpretive exercise of plain meaning analysis and a conditional 
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 1.  723 F.3d 434 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3130 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2014) (No. 
13-339). 
 2.  42 U.S.C. § 9658 (2006).  The FRCD provision preempts statutes of limitations that 
commence earlier than its discovery rule, which refers to “the date the plaintiff knew (or reasona-
bly should have known) that the personal injury of property damages . . . were caused or contrib-
uted to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned.”  Id. § 9658 (b)(4)(A).  
This Note will refer to both the FRCD and to Section 9658 as the preempting provision. 
 3.  Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006). 
 4.  A statute of repose is a statute “barring any suit that is brought after a specified time since 
the defendant acted . . . even if this period ends before the plaintiff has suffered a resulting injury,” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (9th ed. 2009), while a statute of limitations “bars claims after a 
specified period . . . based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was 
discovered).”  Id.  
 5.  Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 437–38. 
 6.  See id. at 437 (“Concluding that North Carolina’s ten-year limitation on the accrual of 
real property claims barred the suit, the district court granted CTS’s . . . motion to dismiss.”).  
 7.  Id. at 442 (“Determining whether § 9658 affects the operation of North Carolina’s ten-
year limitation is an exercise in statutory interpretation.”). 
 2014] WALDBURGER v. CTS CORPORATION 67 
turn toward legislative history.8  The court did not, however, spell out the 
more specific principles of interpretation within its broader interpretive 
method that justified its own conclusion over any others.9  As the case goes 
to the Supreme Court of the United States,10 the principled grounds distin-
guishing the majority’s conclusion as correct remain regrettably unclear.11 
This Note seeks to clearly articulate why the Fourth Circuit’s conclu-
sion is the right one, and elaborates on the Waldburger majority’s reasoning 
as necessary to this task.12  Further, this Note argues that the Supreme Court 
should affirm the Waldburger holding for the following three reasons.  
First, the Fourth Circuit’s decision is supported by a flexible approach to 
plain meaning analysis that appropriately searches for “public” meaning 
and avoids absurdity.13  Second, the Waldburger outcome reflects a more 
credible use of legislative history to effectuate Congress’s purpose in enact-
ing the FRCD.14  Third, the “presumption against preemption” has substan-
tially less weight in this case given certain anomalous features of the 
FRCD.15  These considerations support affirming Waldburger, and the Su-
preme Court would thereby better equip a plaintiff victim of long-latency 
injuries caused by toxic substances to have her day in court. 
I.  THE CASE 
In 2009, David Bradley and Renee Richardson discovered that the well 
water at their Asheville, North Carolina, home contained two carcinogenic 
solvents.16  Bradley and Richardson had purchased their land from Mills 
Gap Road Associates,17 which had itself acquired a fifty-four-acre tract of 
land in 1987 from CTS Corporation (“CTS”) that included the Bradley-
Richardson property.18  From 1959 to 1985, CTS operated the Mills Gap 
Road Electroplating Facility (“Electroplating Facility”) on the land.19  As 
part of its operations, it manufactured and disposed of electronics, which 
                                                          
 8.  Id. at 442, 446, 450. 
 9.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 10.  CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 896 (Jan. 10, 2014) (mem). 
 11.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 12.  See infra Parts IV.B–D. 
 13.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 14.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 15.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 16.  Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 437, 440 (4th Cir. 2013).  The toxins were tri-
chloroethylene (“TCE”) and cis-1, 2-dichloroethane (“DCE”).  Id. at 437. 
 17.  Id. at 440. 
 18.  Id.  
 19.  Id. 
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required it to store significant amounts of toxic solvents and other hazard-
ous materials.20 
When CTS sold its Electroplating Facility property to Mills Gap Road 
Associates, it assured the latter that the land was in “an environmentally 
clean condition,” that “no on-site disposal or otherwise wanton disposal 
methods were practiced,” and that “no threat to human health” remained.21  
Upon discovery of the contaminants in their water supply, Bradley and 
Richardson joined twenty-three neighboring landowners to bring a nuisance 
action against CTS in 2011.22  The group of landowners filed claims assert-
ing diminution of property value and fears for present and future health of 
self and family.23  They requested reclamation24 of toxins in addition to 
monetary damages.25 
The United States District Court for the Western District of North 
Carolina dismissed the landowners’ complaint on the basis that North Caro-
lina’s ten-year limitation for filing actions related to real property barred the 
claim.26  In dismissing the complaint, the district court rejected the land-
owners’ argument that the FRCD preempted the state’s statutory limita-
tion.27  The landowners appealed the judgment to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.28 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The FRCD is an amendment provision in CERCLA that expressly 
preempts state statute of limitations commencement dates for certain tort 
actions.29  Application of the FRCD had a slow start as courts struggled to 
interpret its scope.30  The FRCD has also faced, and prevailed against, 
Tenth Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges.31  Recently, courts 
                                                          
 20.  Id. The court explains that “CTS ‘manufactures’ and ‘disposes of’ electronics and elec-
tronic parts, and from 1959 to 1985 . . . CTS stored notable quantities of TCE and manufactured 
products using TCE, cyanide, chromium VI, and lead.”  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 437, 440. 
 23.  Id. at 440. 
 24.  “Reclamation” is an environmental cleanup procedure defined as “[t]he act or an instance 
of improving the value of economically useless land by physically changing the land.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1385 (9th ed. 2009). 
 25.  Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 440. 
 26.  Id. at 441. 
 27.  Id. The district court adopted the dismissal recommendation of the magistrate court, 
which “reasoned that the ten-year limitation is a statute of repose and that because § 9658 men-
tions only statutes of limitations, it is inapplicable here.”  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 435. 
 29.  See infra Part II.A. 
 30.  See infra Part II.B. 
 31.  See infra Part II.C. 
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began to address the question of whether the FRCD should displace not on-
ly state statutes of limitations but also state statutes of repose.32 
A.  From CERCLA (1980) to SARA (1986): Origins of the FRCD 
The FRCD is embedded in CERCLA, a federal environmental statute 
that creates a liability scheme for hazardous waste cleanup,33 but the FRCD 
only preempts state law so that state law claims may be brought.34  This 
feature is easier to understand when the FRCD is contextualized within the 
ill-fated battle for a federal cause of action for toxic tort claims.  During the 
congressional debates preceding the passage of CERCLA, an early Senate 
bill included a federal cause of action for injuries associated with hazardous 
substance exposure.35  The provision encountered strong opposition, and it 
was replaced by the establishment of a blue ribbon commission (the “Study 
Group”)36 purposed with “determin[ing] the adequacy of existing common 
law and statutory remedies in providing legal redress for harm to man and 
the environment caused by the release of hazardous substances into the en-
vironment.”37 
In 1982, the Study Group submitted its report to Congress.38  Accord-
ing to the Study Group, the inadequacy of common law and statutory reme-
dies was not state statutes of limitations per se, but their commencement 
dates.39  The Study Group recommended that states change their statutes of 
                                                          
 32.  See infra Part II.D. 
 33.  Environmental disasters involving hazardous wastes helped prompt Congress to act 
quickly to pass legislation advancing the remedial goal of cleaning up toxic waste sites.  See Ad-
ministration Testimony to the Subcommittees on Environmental Pollution and Resource Protec-
tion, S. REP. NO. 69-849, at 55 (1980) (statement of Sen. John C. Culver, Chair, S. Subcomm. on 
Res. Prot.) (describing toxic chemical disasters at Love Canal, New York, and James River, Vir-
ginia, as motivation for enactment of federal legislation to clean up old waste dumps and aban-
doned hazardous waste sites and prevent new ones from forming). 
 34.  42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1) (2006). 
 35.  S. 1480, 96th Cong. § 4 (1979) (“Notwithstanding the ordinary requirements for proof of 
cause . . . a person liable under this section for any discharge, release, or disposal of any hazardous 
substance shall be liable for all medical expenses . . . if a reasonable person could conclude that 
such medical expenses and the injury or disease which caused them are reasonably related to such 
discharge, release or disposal . . . .  The inability of a claimant to demonstrate (1) the particular 
identity of the substance which caused the injury or disease, (2) the particular source of such sub-
stance, (3) the pathway of such substance en route to the injured party, or (4) an explanation of the 
etiology of the substance in the injured party, shall not bar recovery.”). 
 36.   The Study Group was comprised of three people selected by each president of the Amer-
ican Bar Association, American Law Institute, Association of American Trial Lawyers, and Na-
tional Association of State Attorneys General, totaling twelve selectees.  42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)(2). 
 37.  Id. § 9651(e)(1). 
 38.  SUPERFUND SECTION 301(E) STUDY GRP., INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS 
WASTES—ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES, S. DOC. NO. 97-571 (1982) 
[hereinafter STUDY GROUP REPORT]. 
 39.  Id. at 43. 
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limitations relevant to personal injury caused by hazardous substances to 
limitations periods triggered by discovery of the injury and its cause instead 
of the date of hazardous substance exposure.40  Such changes would allow 
plaintiffs suffering injuries dormant well beyond the state statute of limita-
tions to hold the responsible parties liable.41 
Congress ultimately neither enacted a federal cause of action nor ac-
cepted the recommendation of the Study Group.  Although a federal cause 
of action was again promoted in the years preceding CERCLA’s reauthori-
zation, such efforts failed in both the House42 and Senate.43  The House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce drafted the political compromise,44 
which would become CERCLA Section 9658 as part of the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (“SARA”).45  The critical 
text of Section 9658 reads: 
 In the case of any action brought under State law for personal 
injury, or property damages, which are caused or contributed to 
by exposure to any hazardous substance, or pollutant or contami-
nant, released into the environment from a facility, if the applica-
ble limitations period for such action (as specified in the State 
statute of limitations or under common law) provides a com-
mencement date46 which is earlier than the federally required 
commencement date,47 such period shall commence at the feder-
ally required commencement date in lieu of the date specified in 
such State statute.48 
Section 9658 thus provides for express preemption of state law, but not 
all state statutes of limitations will be preempted where the state law claims 
specified in Section 9658 are made.  That is, the FRCD is triggered only 
where a state’s commencement date is earlier, and so if a state already has 
adopted a similar discovery rule commencement date, the FRCD might not 
                                                          
 40.  Id. at 255–56. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  H.R. 2582, 98th Cong. §§ 9011–9012 (1983) (bill proposed by Rep. Edward J. Markey). 
 43.  S. 917, 98th Cong. § 5 (1983) (bill proposed by Senator Stafford); S. 945, 98th Cong. § 4 
(1983) (bill proposed by Senator Mitchell). 
 44.   H.R. REP. NO. 99-253, pt.1, at 34–35, 105–06 (1985) [hereinafter HOUSE COMMITTEE 
REPORT]. 
 45.  Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). 
 46.  This refers to the “date specified in a statute of limitations as the beginning of the appli-
cable limitations period.”  42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(3) (2006). 
 47.  This refers to the “date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that the 
personal injury or property damages . . . were caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance 
or pollutant or contaminant concerned.”  Id. § 9658(b)(4)(A). 
 48.  Id. § 9658(a)(1). 
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apply.49  Further, “preemption,” in this context, does not simply mean that 
the federal rule displaces state statutes entirely; the limitations period itself 
remains untouched, but it commences later.50  Thus, the FRCD addresses 
the problem at which efforts toward a federal cause of action were aimed—
permitting toxic tort plaintiffs their day in court—but it does so by narrowly 
targeting certain types of state law actions governed by certain kinds of lim-
itations periods.51 
B.  Defining the Substantive Scope of the FRCD—Injury and Cause of 
Action 
The scope of application of the FRCD was initially defined very strict-
ly, requiring that plaintiffs have a federal law claim under CERCLA as well 
as a state law claim.52  This standard soon relaxed, dropping the CERCLA 
claim requirement, although CERCLA definitions continue to constrain 
FRCD application.53  Further, questions remain as to what specific kinds of 
state law actions are relevant to the FRCD.54 
1.  The Relationship Between CERCLA and the FRCD 
An early case in which the FRCD was considered set a highly restric-
tive standard of application.  In Knox v. AC & S, Inc.,55 the plaintiffs 
brought suit for injuries allegedly caused by workplace exposure to asbes-
tos.56  The court held that this type of injury was not within the scope of the 
FRCD because the FRCD was intended to apply to “situation[s] where a 
state cause of action exists in conjunction with a CERCLA cause of ac-
tion.”57  The Knox court inferred such congressional intent from Sec-
tion 9658’s placement within CERCLA generally and its incorporation of a 
                                                          
 49.  See, e.g., Village of Milford v. K-H Holding Corp., 390 F.3d 926, 932 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(finding that Michigan’s discovery rule is “functionally identical” to the FRCD and so the state 
discovery rule applied); O’Connor v. Boeing North American, Inc., 311 F.3d 1139, 1148 (9th Cir. 
2002) (finding that California’s discovery rule would commence earlier than the FRCD, and so 
was preempted by the FRCD); Presque Isle Harbor Dev. Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 875 F. Supp. 
1312, 1319 (W.D. Mich. 1995) (finding Michigan’s standard “functionally identical” to the FRCD 
so that the latter did not apply). 
 50.  42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 53.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 54.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
 55.  690 F. Supp. 752 (S.D. Ind. 1988). 
 56.  Id. at 754. 
 57.  See id. at 758 (“In fact, the wording of § 9658 and its incorporation of the terms of 
CERCLA and the CERCLA definition of those terms indicate that the provision was limited to 
application in the situation where a state cause of action exists in conjunction with a CERCLA 
cause of action.  That not being the case here, the court finds that § 9658 is inapplicable . . . .”). 
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number of CERCLA definitions.58  This interpretation meant that plaintiffs 
injured by exposure to hazardous substances or pollutants could not litigate 
their state law claims unless they were also attempting to bring an action 
against parties for liability under CERCLA.59 
The limiting Knox interpretation did not become the prevailing stand-
ard of FRCD applicability.  Another early case, Covalt v. Carey Canada, 
Inc.,60 maintained the requirement that the words in Section 9658 that are 
CERCLA terms of art cannot be interpreted independently.61  The Covalt 
court, however, did not find an accompanying CERCLA claim necessary 
for the FRCD to apply.62  The upshot was a less restrictive threshold test re-
quiring (1) a “hazardous substance”63 or “pollutant or contaminant” (2) “re-
leased”64 (3) “into the environment”65 (4) from a “facility.”66  The problem 
with the workplace asbestos claim before it, the Covalt court found, was 
that this injury did not constitute a “release” into the “environment.”67  Alt-
hough very few broad applications of Covalt’s definitions test exist,68 the 
“increasingly more common” scope-of-CERCLA approach has been for 
courts to demand that “the CERCLA definitions . . . are met, both from a 
                                                          
 58.  Id. 
 59.  See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (2006) (describing potentially liable parties and the costs they 
may incur, including “all costs of removal or remedial action,” “any other necessary costs,” and 
“costs of any health assessment”).  Id. 
 60.  860 F.2d 1434 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 61.  Id. at 1436–37 (explaining that “a reading of this sort trivializes statutory language”). 
 62.  See id. at 1436 (finding only that “[w]hether § 9658 applies depends on whether the as-
bestos to which Covalt was exposed . . . was ‘released into the environment from a facility,’” as 
opposed to finding that the CERCLA elements must be met and that there must be an independent 
CERCLA cause of action). 
 63.  42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).  This code definition includes a number of designated substances.  
Id. 
 64.  See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (defining the term “release” as “any spilling, leaking, pumping, 
pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing 
into the environment,” and stating some exclusions including wholly intra-workplace hazards). 
 65.  42 U.S.C. § 9601(8). The term “environment” encompasses “(A) the navigable waters, 
the waters of the contiguous zone, and the ocean waters of which the natural resources are under 
the exclusive management authority of the United States . . . and (B) any other surface water, 
ground water, drinking water supply, land surface or subsurface strata, or ambient air within the 
United States or under the jurisdiction of the United States.”  Id.  
 66.  42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).  The term ”facility” includes “(A) any building, structure, installa-
tion, equipment, pipe or pipeline . . . well, pit, pond, lagoon . . . or (B) any site or area where a 
hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be 
located . . . .”  Id. 
 67.  Covalt, 860 F.2d at 1436–37. 
 68.  See, e.g., Kowalski v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 841 F. Supp. 104, 108 (W.D.N.Y. 
1994) (finding release into the environment where toxic chemicals transferred from husband’s 
clothing to wife each day). 
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pleading and evidentiary standpoint.”69  Many claims have consequently 
been barred by state statutes of limitations for not showing the proper kind 
of injury.70 
The first reported application of FRCD preemption was in Bolin v. 
Cessna Aircraft Co.71  After discovering the “probable human carcinogen” 
of TCE in their wells, plaintiff landowners brought suit against the owner 
and operator of a nearby aircraft manufacturing plant.72  Plaintiffs alleged 
state law causes of action including negligence, intentional public and pri-
vate nuisance, and strict liability for ultrahazardous substances.73  The de-
fendant in Bolin conceded that “plaintiffs’ state claims fall within the terms 
of [the FRCD],” and the court ruled that the plaintiffs’ claims were timely 
under Section 9658.74  Post-Bolin, courts continued to find preemption of 
state statutes of limitations where the CERCLA definitions test was met.75 
2.  The Relationship Between the FRCD and Wrongful Death 
Actions 
Another issue relating to the kind of injuries to which the FRCD can 
apply is whether the FRCD can revive wrongful death claims.  This issue is 
less settled than the controversy over how connected plaintiffs’ injuries 
must be to CERCLA causes of action and key statutory terms,76 but is just 
as much a matter of judicial statutory interpretation.  In Freier v. Westing-
house Electric Corp.,77 the Second Circuit held that wrongful death claims 
fall within the scope of Section 9658.78  Although Section 9658 refers simp-
ly to “personal injury” claims,79 the Freier court pointed to the fact that 
Congress had spoken broadly of its concern about “harm” posed by hazard-
                                                          
 69.  Cal R. Burnton, CERCLA’s Toxic Tort Discovery Rule: It’s Not as Clear as It Reads, 25 
TOXICS L. REP. (BNA), July 15, 2010, at 710. 
 70.  See, e.g., Becton v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 706 So.2d 1134, 1142 (Ala. 1997) (finding that 
plaintiff failed to show all CERCLA elements); Rivas v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 98 Cal.App.4th 218, 
238–40 (2002) (same). 
 71.  759 F. Supp. 692 (D. Kan. 1991). 
 72.  Id. at 697–98. 
 73.  Id. at 698. 
 74.  Id. at 704, 709. 
 75.  See, e.g., Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. Wilhite, 143 S.W.3d 604, 617 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003) 
(finding plaintiff’s claims not barred by statutes of limitations where injury involved release of 
PCBs); Tower Asphalt, Inc. v. Determan Welding & Tank Serv., Inc., 530 N.W.2d 872, 876 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (finding plaintiff did not need underlying CERCLA claim where injury 
involved hazardous solvents); Soo Line R.R. Co. v. B.J. Carney & Co., 797 F. Supp. 1472, 1487 
(D. Minn. 1992) (finding that statutes of limitations did not bar actions for injuries involving con-
tinuous release of hazardous substances). 
 76.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 77.  303 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 78.  Id. at 200. 
 79.  42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1) (2006). 
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ous substance exposure in commissioning the Study Group.80  Further, a 
denial of wrongful death damages would suggest that “a company whose 
handling of hazardous wastes caused personal injury would be financially 
better off if its victim died,” an unacceptable consequence in the court’s 
view.81 
In Lee v. CSX Transportation, Inc.,82 the District Court of Appeal of 
Florida for the Second District declined to follow Freier.  Citing numerous 
principles of statutory interpretation,83 the Lee court held that wrongful 
death actions do not fall within the category of “personal injury” actions, 
and therefore the FRCD does not apply to them.84  The court emphasized 
two principles of interpretation: that the common law meaning of statutory 
terms is deemed intended by Congress unless there is a contrary indica-
tion,85 and that historic state police powers should be respected unless 
preemption is the “‘clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’”86  Given that 
wrongful death actions have long been considered distinct from personal 
injury actions, and that, of the two legal terms, the FRCD refers only to the 
latter, the Lee court found that interpretive principles recommended against 
preemption.87 
C.  The FRCD Confronts Constitutional Challenges 
The FRCD has faced Tenth Amendment88 and Commerce Clause89 
challenges.  It survived Tenth Amendment challenges on the basis that it 
has not been found to strip states of essential sovereign power,90 and it sur-
vived Commerce Clause challenges on the basis of its demonstrated con-
nection to interstate commerce.91 
                                                          
 80.  Freier, 303 F.3d at 199. 
 81.  Id. at 200. 
 82.  958 So. 2d 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
 83.  Id. at 580–81. 
 84.  Id. at 582. 
 85.  Id. at 580–81. 
 86.  Id. at 581 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 87.  Id. at 582–84. 
 88. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”). 
 89.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to “regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States”). 
 90.  See infra Part II.C.1. 
 91.  See infra Part II.C.2. 
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1.  Tenth Amendment Challenges 
A handful of cases have addressed defendants’ claims that the FRCD 
violates the Tenth Amendment.92  For example, in Bolin, the defendant ar-
gued that the FRCD unconstitutionally infringes on state sovereignty by re-
quiring the states to permit claims that state law otherwise bars.93  The 
Bolin court relied on Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authori-
ty94 in its response that the Tenth Amendment does not stipulate an affirma-
tive restriction on the constitutional authority of Congress to “legislate un-
der power otherwise conferred by the commerce clause.”95  Further, the 
Bolin court argued that Garcia did not set a standard for determining what 
would show an unconstitutional stripping of “core” or “essential” attributes 
of state sovereignty, making it difficult to appeal to the amendment to chal-
lenge congressional legislation.96  Later cases would also assert that the 
FRCD does not direct state courts to apply federal law in a way prohibited 
under the Tenth Amendment; rather, it establishes the “modest require-
ment” that courts “recognize the Federal Commencement Date of a state-
law claim.”97  In sum, the FRCD has survived any Tenth Amendment-based 
challenge it has faced. 
2.  Commerce Clause Challenges 
Some cases that considered Tenth Amendment challenges to the 
FRCD also addressed arguments that the enactment of the FRCD exceeded 
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.  Courts rejected these 
arguments on the basis that the FRCD is “an integral part of” the wider 
CERCLA regulatory program, and the main subject of CERCLA—disposal 
of hazardous waste—is well-connected to interstate commerce.98  Beyond 
its clear remedial goals, CERCLA was meant to induce those generating, 
transporting, storing, or disposing of hazardous wastes to “voluntarily . . . 
pursue appropriate environmental response actions with respect to inactive 
hazardous waste sites.”99  The FRCD has thus been held to be an exercise of 
congressional power that neither violates the Tenth Amendment nor ex-
ceeds Commerce Clause authority. 
                                                          
 92.  See, e.g., Freier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2002); Bolin v. 
Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692 (D. Kan. 1991).  
 93.  Bolin, 759 F. Supp. at 705. 
 94.  469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 95.  Bolin, 759 F. Supp. at 705. 
 96.  Id. at 706. 
 97.  See Freier, 303 F.3d at 204–05. 
 98.  See, e.g., id. at 202 (stating that “wastes are commonly transported in interstate com-
merce”). 
 99.  Id. at 203 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016(I), at 17). 
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D.  Rise of the Repose Debates 
Until fairly recently, the issue of statute of repose preemption was not 
controversial.100  This changed, however, when the Fifth Circuit ruled that 
the FRCD plainly does not preempt state statutes of repose.101  A circuit 
split emerged when the Ninth Circuit held that the FRCD does preempt 
state statutes of repose.102 
1.  A Controversy with a Long Latency Period 
The first judicial considerations of FRCD application consistently held 
that state statutes of repose were not preempted,103 but they reached their 
holdings by finding the FRCD inapplicable to claims involving injuries that 
did not bear sufficient relation to CERCLA causes of action or at least its 
definitions.104  This point was acknowledged in A.S.I., Inc. v. Sanders,105 
where the defendant argued that the FRCD cannot preempt statutes of re-
pose given that they are “substantive” as opposed to “procedural” law.106  
The Sanders court referenced Knox, Covalt, Electric Power Board of Chat-
tanooga v. Westinghouse,107 and First United Methodist Church v. U.S. 
Gypsum Co.108 to show the distinction between statutes of limitations and 
statutes of repose was not viewed as legally relevant.109  A decade later, the 
court in Morgan v. Exxon Corp.110 found that the statute of repose at issue 
was not preempted because the toxic contamination injury did not meet the 
CERCLA definitions test for FRCD application.111  The Morgan court also 
did not recognize a legal issue concerning the distinctiveness of statutes of 
repose.112 
The decision of the Fifth Circuit in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe 
Railway Co. v. Poole Chemical Co.113 altered the legal landscape with re-
spect to the category of state limitation law susceptible to preemption.  The 
court in Burlington held that the FRCD does not preempt a state statute of 
repose because of the “substantive, not merely semantic” differences be-
                                                          
 100.  See infra Part II.D.1. 
 101.  See infra Part II.D.1. 
 102.  See infra Part II.D.2. 
 103.  See supra Part II.B. 
 104.  See supra Part II.B. 
 105.  835 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Kan. 1993). 
 106.  Id. at 1358. 
 107.  716 F. Supp. 1069 (E.D. Tenn. 1988). 
 108.  882 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 109.  Sanders, 835 F. Supp. at 1358. 
 110.  869 So. 2d 446 (Ala. 2003). 
 111.  Id. at 451–52 (noting CERCLA’s “petroleum exclusion”). 
 112.  Id. (focusing only on whether CERCLA definitions were met). 
 113.  419 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2005). 
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tween these statutes and statutes of repose.114  The court looked to the plain 
language of the FRCD that provides for preemption of statutes of limita-
tions but not statutes of repose, and found that these statutes had very dif-
ferent meanings and, thus, the latter were not automatically subsumable un-
der the former.115  In particular, “awareness of injury is not a factor in 
determining when the time period of a statute of repose starts to run.  Un-
like a statute of limitations, a statute of repose creates a substantive right to 
be free from liability.”116  Lower courts began to follow Burlington’s con-
clusion that statutes of repose, in light of their distinction from statutes of 
limitations, were not preempted by the FRCD.117 
2.  A Decision by the Ninth Circuit Resulted in a Circuit Split 
In McDonald v. Sun Oil Co.,118 the Ninth Circuit held that the FRCD 
includes state statutes of repose and explained its disagreement with the 
Burlington decision.119  The McDonald court cited a number of cases in the 
years preceding SARA that involved confusion or the interchangeable use 
of statutes of limitations and statutes of repose.120  According to the 
McDonald court, these cases showed ambiguity in the meaning of “statute 
of limitations,” and therefore justified looking beyond the plain meaning of 
the statute to see what legislative history revealed about congressional in-
tent.121  The McDonald court found that Congress’s main concern in enact-
ing the FRCD was to ensure that plaintiffs’ claims dealing with long-
latency injuries are not barred and that preemption of statutes of repose was 
necessary to affect this purpose.122 
                                                          
 114.  Id. at 362. 
 115.  Id. at 362–63. 
 116.  Id. at 363 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 117.  See Evans v. Walter Indus., 579 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1364 (N.D. Ala. 2008) (“[T]he court 
agrees with the Fifth Circuit and courts following Burlington and holds that the plain language of 
§ 9658 does not encompass a rule of repose and, therefore, does not preempt Alabama’s twenty-
year rule of repose.”); German ex rel Grace v. CSX Transp., Inc., 510 F. Supp. 2d 630, 633 (S.D. 
Ala. 2007) (“As discussed in Burlington, the text of § 9658 does not mention statutes or rules of 
repose but instead discusses only statutes of limitation.  Under the principles of statutory construc-
tion, the plain language of § 9658 should be given effect.”).  But see Fisher v. Ciba Specialty 
Chems. Corp., No. 03-0566-WS-B, 2007 WL 2995525, at *20 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 11, 2007) (conclud-
ing that Alabama’s common law rule of repose was preempted by the FRCD). 
 118.  548 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 119.  Id. at 782; see also Moore v. Walter Coke, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-1391-SLB, 2012 WL 
4731255, at *13 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2012) (finding that the FRCD preempted Alabama’s rule of 
repose); Abrams v. Ciba Specialty Chems. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1235 (S.D. Ala. 2009) 
(same). 
 120.  McDonald, 548 F.3d at 781 n.3. 
 121.  Id. at 782–83 (looking to both a House Conference Report and the STUDY GROUP 
REPORT, supra note 38, as guiding legislative history). 
 122.  Id. 
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III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Waldburger v. CTS Corporation, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the judgment of the 
United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, and 
held that CERCLA Section 9658 preempted North Carolina’s ten-year stat-
ute of repose.123  In so holding, the court enabled the landowners’ nuisance 
claim.124  The court reasoned that the reference to “statute of limitations” in 
Section 9658 was ambiguous,125 and that legislative history suggested Con-
gress intended for CERCLA’s discovery rule to preempt state statutes of re-
pose as well as statutes of limitations.126  Further, the court stressed that, in 
determining the status of state statutes of repose, a balance must be struck 
between the rights of plaintiffs and defendants rather than permitting such 
statutes to stand only for defendants’ rights.127 
The court addressed the question of whether CERCLA’s discovery 
rule preempts state statutes of repose in addition to statutes of limitations as 
a straightforward question of statutory interpretation.128  The discovery rule 
in Section 9658 states that “if the applicable limitations period for [an] ac-
tion . . . provides a commencement date which is earlier than the federally 
required commencement date,” the federal date is controlling.129  The nar-
rower legal issue, then, was whether a statute of repose fit the meaning of 
“applicable limitations period,”130 which according to Section 9658 will be 
“specified in the State statute of limitations or under common law.”131 
The court found Section 9658 ambiguous and reasoned that it could be 
interpreted as applying to North Carolina’s statute of repose.132  The repose 
statute is located with other statutes of limitations in a statutory section ti-
tled, “Limitations, Other than Real Property.”133  For the court, this meant 
that the statute of repose fit under Section 9658, since it was a limitation pe-
riod and was technically “specified in the State statute of limitations.”134  
The court briefly touched on two “additional observations” to support its 
finding of ambiguity.135  First, citing McDonald, the court called attention 
                                                          
 123.  723 F.3d 434, 445 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. at 442–43. 
 126.  Id. at 443–44. 
 127.  Id. at 444–45. 
 128.  Id. at 442. 
 129.  42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1)( 2006). 
 130.  Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 442. 
 131.  42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1). 
 132.  Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 442–43. 
 133.  Id. at 442. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. at 443. 
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to the historical tendency of statutes and prior case law to fail to distinguish 
statutes of limitations and statutes of repose, and argued that this estab-
lished ambiguity in the statutory text.136  Second, the court pointed to a 
“lack of internal consistency” within Section 9658, and so concluded it 
“fail[ed] to manifest a plain meaning.”137 
After finding Section 9658 ambiguous, the court looked to the House 
Conference Report preceding SARA’s passage in order to determine 
whether Congress intended preemption of statutes of repose.138  The court 
concluded that it did intend preemption because the Conference Report in-
dicated that Congress was concerned with the problem of plaintiffs’ claims 
being barred before they are aware of them, which results from statutes of 
limitations and statutes of repose alike.139  Further, noting that CERCLA 
has been labeled “the most remedial of all federal environmental stat-
utes,”140 the court found that a liberal construction standard was appropri-
ate.141  The “unmistakable goal” of Congress was to ensure that relief from 
toxic contamination could be secured, and therefore allowing state statutes 
of repose to stand in the way of such relief, the court argued, would thwart 
Congress’s goal.142 
The court also challenged the notion that statutes of repose are, at their 
core, concerned with the rights of defendants.143  The court noted that such 
statutes always involve a balancing of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ rights, and 
the circumstances of the case at bar suggested that North Carolina’s repose 
statute needed to “tip in favor of plaintiffs.”144  The FRCD could and 
should, the court concluded, be interpreted as preempting state statutes of 
repose.145 
Judge Davis wrote a brief concurring opinion.146  He asserted that the 
dissenting opinion treated the plain meaning rule too much like a “rule of 
                                                          
 136.  See id. (“[G]iven the inconsistent manner in which the term has been used, it is entirely 
probable that in 1986, when Congress added § 9658 to CERCLA, it intended ‘statute of limita-
tions’ to include precisely the type of ten-year limitation that we are dealing with here.”). 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id.  
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. (quoting Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial 
Purpose Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 199, 286 (1996)). 
 141.  See id. at 443–44 (rejecting exclusion of the North Carolina statute of repose from appli-
cation of § 9658 as “too narrow an approach”).  
 142.  Id. at 444. 
 143.  Id. at 444–45. 
 144.  Id. at 445. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. (Davis, J., concurring). 
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law” as opposed to an “axiom of experience.”147  Judge Davis applauded 
the willingness of the court to look at statutory context and other “persua-
sive evidence” of Congress’s intent, should such evidence exist.148 
Judge Thacker, dissenting from the majority opinion, argued that the 
plain meaning of § 9658 compels the exclusion of statutes of repose from 
preemption; that even if the statute was ambiguous, congressional intent 
was to exclude statutes of repose; and, that the presumption against preemp-
tion would counsel against permitting Section 9658 to reach statutes of re-
pose.149  Judge Thacker stressed that Section 9658 repeatedly used the term 
“statute of limitations,” but never the conceptually distinct “statute of re-
pose.”150  She argued that the definition of “statute of limitations” that was 
available to Congress when SARA was passed made clear that statutes of 
limitations were sometimes called “statutes of repose,” but not vice ver-
sa.151  Further, Judge Thacker pointed out that the Study Group responsible 
for making CERCLA recommendations did include statutes of repose (por-
trayed as distinct from statutes of limitations), but their language on this 
point was noticeably absent from SARA.152  Finally, Judge Thacker sug-
gested that the majority’s holding did not give proper deference to the 
standard presumption against preemption.153  She found that the majority 
ignored North Carolina’s ability to carve into law a substantive right to es-
cape tort liabilities after a given time period, although this ability “is un-
questionably a traditional field of state regulation.”154  For these reasons, 
Judge Thacker concluded that she would have affirmed the lower court’s 
decision.155 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Waldburger v. CTS Corporation, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit held that CERCLA Section 9658 preempted 
                                                          
 147.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. (Thacker, J., dissenting). 
 150.  See id. at 448–49 (noting that Congress did not include the phrase “statute of repose” in § 
9658 and arguing that “statute of limitation” was different in meaning and unambiguous when the 
provision was adopted). 
 151.  See id. (defining “statute of limitations” as a “statute . . . declaring that no suit shall be 
maintained . . . unless brought within a specified period of time after the right accrued.  Statutes of 
limitations are statutes of repose” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 835 (5th ed. 1979))). 
 152.  Id. at 450–52 (suggesting that despite the language of the 301(e) Report, Congress “chose 
to leave” § 9658 without any reference to statutes of repose). 
 153.  Id. at 453. 
 154.  Id.  
 155.  Id. at 454. 
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North Carolina’s ten-year statute of repose.156  The plaintiffs were conse-
quently able to bring their state nuisance claims against a manufacturer that 
had allegedly contaminated their properties with hazardous substances.157  
The Waldburger majority and dissent used the same basic method of statu-
tory interpretation, but this Note explores the principled differences be-
tween the two regarding their applications of plain meaning analysis and 
guidance by legislative history.158 This Note further argues that, although 
the Waldburger majority did not clarify these differences or their potential 
implications,159 it reached the right conclusion for three main reasons: First, 
its decision is supported by a flexible approach to plain meaning analysis 
that appropriately searches for “public” meaning160 and avoids absurdity;161 
second, its decision reflects a proper use of legislative history that empha-
sizes proximity and specificity;162 third, the Waldburger majority’s conclu-
sion is not undermined by the presumption against preemption, as anoma-
lous features of the FRCD limit the presumption’s relevance.163  The 
Supreme Court should, then, affirm the Fourth Circuit’s Waldburger hold-
ing. 
A.  Differences Based on Principles of How to Apply the Same Method 
of Statutory Analysis Exist Between the Waldburger Majority and 
Dissenting Opinions 
Although the Waldburger majority and dissent ostensibly follow one 
approach to statutory interpretation to determine whether the FRCD 
preempts North Carolina’s statute of repose,164 their opposing conclusions 
                                                          
 156.  Id. at 438 (majority opinion). 
 157.  Id. at 437–38. 
 158.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 159.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 160.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 161.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 162.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 163.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 164.  The general approach of the majority and dissent—plain meaning analysis and then con-
sideration of sources, such as legislative history, if the text is ambiguous—at least appears 
straightforward and unlikely to unravel into controversy.  The commitment to both sticking to the 
text and reaching into legislative history is a somewhat eclectic mix of textbook doctrines but a 
common interpretive strategy of judges.  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism 
and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 532 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & 
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)) (stating that 
“virtually all . . . judges are ‘textualists,’ in the sense that all consider the text the starting point for 
statutory interpretation and follow statutory plain meaning if the text is clear,” and “virtually 
all . . . judges are also ‘purposivists,’ in the sense that all believe that statutory interpretation ought 
to advance statutory purposes, so long as such interpretations do not impose on words a meaning 
they will not bear”).  Further, a primary purpose of engaging plain meaning analysis over compet-
ing approaches is to limit opportunities for judges to widen the pool of candidate meanings in 
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suggest deeper doctrinal fissures.  Key differences in interpretive preference 
can be gleaned from a brief comparison of the types of resources called up-
on by the majority and dissent for their respective analyses of the FRCD.165  
The majority, for example, favors a broader “historical analysis,” account-
ing for the work of scholars and courts to determine the plain meaning of 
“statute of limitations” in 1986,166 and is attentive to the implications of tex-
tual inconsistency.167  In contrast, the dissent turns solely to Black’s Law 
Dictionary.168  On finding ambiguity, the extraneous guides the majority 
selected are the House Conference Report and remedial purpose canon.169 
On assuming ambiguity for the sake of argument, the dissent selects only 
the Study Group Report to divine congressional intent.170  Finally, the ma-
jority does not find the presumption against preemption salient enough to 
merit any consideration,171 while the dissent finds it strong enough to coun-
sel against preemption if the statute was found ambiguous.172 
Judge Davis’s concurrence marks a fine point of departure for assign-
ing the differences in interpretive style between the majority and dissent 
doctrinal import.  Judge Davis suggested that the problem with the dissent-
ing opinion is its rigid application of the plain meaning rule, a rule which 
“‘does not preclude . . . persuasive evidence’” and wider considerations of 
context.173  This observation admits of generalization in the sense that the 
majority consistently evinces greater willingness to take up broader or more 
liberal interpretive devices and avoids rigid adherence to established rules 
                                                          
questionable ways.  See Donald G. Gifford, William L. Reynolds & Andrew M. Murad, A Case 
Study in the Superiority of the Purposive Approach to Statutory Interpretation: Bruesewitz v. Wy-
eth, 64 S.C. L. REV. 221, 229 (2012) (explaining that proponents of plain meaning analysis hope 
to prevent “unbridled judicial subjectivity” that might result from considering resources like legis-
lative history before establishing textual ambiguity).  It is striking, then, that judges utilizing a 
plain meaning approach should produce different results.  See id. at 224 (suggesting how, at least 
at first glance, it seems odd that two Supreme Court justices using plain meaning analysis should 
reach opposing conclusions). 
 165.  See supra Part III. 
 166.  See supra note 136. 
 167.  See supra text accompanying note 137. 
 168.  See supra note 151. 
 169.  See supra notes 138–142 and accompanying text. 
 170.  See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 171.  The majority simply states that “[d]etermining whether § 9658 affects the operation of 
North Carolina’s ten-year limitation is an exercise in statutory interpretation.”  Waldburger v. CTS 
Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 442 (4th Cir. 2013).  The dissent, however, notes that the case arises “in the 
context of federal preemption,” and expands on the importance of this by devoting a full section to 
discussing the presumption against preemption.  Id. at 446, 453 (Thacker, J., dissenting). 
 172.  See supra text accompanying notes 153–154. 
 173.  Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 445 (Davis, J., concurring) (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 
259, 266 (1981)). 
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or presumptions.174  The dissent, though, keeps close to the text and to the 
formal meaning of words, and does not view recognized presumptions as 
contextually flexible.175  The majority and dissent also each seem to have 
some means of distinguishing better and worse legislative history guides, as 
they select different sources to help interpret what Congress meant by “stat-
ute of limitations.”176  There are, then, narrower and principled distinctions 
underlying the majority-dissent rift. 
Unfortunately, the Judge Davis concurrence is the only real gesture in 
Waldburger toward sorting the conclusions of the majority and dissent on 
the basis of explicit legal principle.177  The core problem with the court’s 
reluctance to link its outcome to more specific interpretive positions is that, 
as Waldburger is a case that deepened a circuit split,178 its most productive 
contribution perhaps would have been to clarify why opposing conclusions 
do not apply plain meaning analysis and recourse to legislative history as 
well.179  Moreover, absent this explanatory contribution, some risk was cre-
ated that political reasons would be read into the Waldburger decision, to 
the detriment of its persuasive value.180  Although the fear that legal deci-
                                                          
 174.  For example, the majority appeals to the remedial purpose canon, which justifies liberal 
construction, and treats neither the plain meaning rule nor presumption against preemption as hard 
and fast rules.  See id. at 442–44 (majority opinion). 
 175.  For example, the dissent relies on law dictionary definitions and does not recognize the 
potential contextual flexibility of the presumption against preemption.  See id. at 448, 453 (Thack-
er, J., dissenting). 
 176.  See supra Part III. 
 177.  It is nevertheless significant that Judge Davis perceived a need to write a concurrence.  
The majority does not address its interpretive means where they differ from those of the dissent, 
but Judge Davis sought to place the majority and dissent in direct conversation to shed light on 
how their views relate to “important, overarching principle[s].”  Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 445 
(Davis, J., concurring).  Given that the concurrence is only one paragraph, however, it can only be 
the start of such a conversation. 
 178.  See supra Part II.D.2. 
 179.  Interestingly, statutory interpretation debates concerning whether the FRCD preempts 
wrongful death limitations statutes involve at least one case, Lee v. CSX Transportation, Inc., in 
which the court explicitly rejects the reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit because it “did not make reference to the principles applicable to interpreting the 
scope of federal statutes preempting state law” and so seemed to be merely “a strong policy argu-
ment.”  958 So.2d 578, 583 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).  For a review of the issue of the FRCD and 
wrongful death preemption, see Part II.C.2.  The repose debates relating to the FRCD are no less a 
matter of persuasive statutory interpretation than are the wrongful death debates, and so the Wald-
burger court is vulnerable as well to other courts’ rejections of its conclusions because it did not 
offer narrower guiding principles throughout its reasoning. 
 180.  See Bryan D. Lammon, What We Talk About When We Talk About Ideology: Judicial 
Politics Scholarship and Naïve Legal Realism, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 231, 238–40 (2009) (dis-
cussing the ease with which judges’ conclusions become viewed as ideological biases emanating 
from partisan politics); Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Several Meanings of “Politics” in Judicial Poli-
tics Studies: Why “Ideological Influence” Is Not “Partisanship,” 61 EMORY L.J. 759, 759–65 
(2012) (describing how a lack of clarity regarding judges’ “high” or principled bases for decision-
making often leads to dismissals of conclusions as petty political opinions).  Regarding Wald-
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sions will be made on the basis of will rather than judgment is hardly 
new,181 the potential for judges to find and operate within grey areas of the 
law is at its height in cases turning on construal of statutory meaning.182  It 
is worthwhile, then, to consider in detail the reasons why the Fourth Circuit 
majority rightly decided Waldburger. 
B.  The Waldburger Holding Is Supported by a Flexible Approach to 
Plain Meaning Analysis That Appropriately Searches for “Public” 
Meaning and Avoids Absurdity 
The Waldburger court’s consideration of the meaning of “statute of 
limitations” in Section 9658 reflects an approach to plain meaning analysis 
that searches for “public” meaning rather than “technical/legalist” meaning, 
and is thereby able to ascertain congressional intent.183  Further, the court’s 
willingness to look at the wider context and implications of the text, if 
pushed further, would show how the plain (literal) meaning of the text can 
lead to absurdity.184  Therefore, two key reasons the Supreme Court should 
affirm the Fourth Circuit’s Waldburger holding are that it is the outcome of 
the better of two varieties of plain meaning analysis,185 and it does not re-
sult in any absurd consequences.186 
1. The Waldburger Majority’s Conclusion That Section 9658 
Preempted North Carolina’s Statute of Repose Is Supported by 
a Plain Meaning Analysis That Appropriately Focuses on 
“Public” Meaning 
The Waldburger court implicitly relies on a popular or “public” mean-
ing variant of plain meaning analysis.  Professor Victoria Nourse has called 
                                                          
burger, the worry about politicized judging would likely translate into an association of the major-
ity with a liberal, “pro-environment” agenda, given Waldburger’s strengthening of CERCLA’s 
preemptive power. 
 181.  See Eric A. Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial 
Bias Studies for Legal and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853, 873–74 (2008) (“Con-
cerns about judicial bias are longstanding: critics of Lochnerism argued that the judges substituted 
their conservative policy preferences for the liberal preferences of the Roosevelt government and 
many state legislatures.”). 
 182.  See Jill C. Anderson, Misreading Like a Lawyer: Cognitive Bias in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 127 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (explaining that statutes are subject to far more am-
biguity than commonly perceived because they contain not only “lexical” ambiguity or ambiguity 
which arises “from the meaning of individual words,” but also “structural” ambiguity, which aris-
es “from the semantic structure of the sentence as a whole” and the resultant frequent appearance 
of “opaque verbs”).   
 183.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 184.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 185.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 186.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 2014] WALDBURGER v. CTS CORPORATION 85 
attention to the finer distinctions within plain meaning analysis, which she 
parses into an approach seeking the popular meaning of words versus one 
that seeks the technical or legalist meaning.187  The latter appears the nar-
rower of the two approaches, and so has appeal for those most concerned to 
avoid any unnecessary widening of candidate meanings of textual terms.188  
By favoring a broader consideration of what Congress meant by “statute of 
limitations,”189 the Waldburger court opted for a mode of analysis suited for 
finding what the meaning would have been in the public political realm in 
which Congress acts. 
More specifically, the court engaged a public meaning approach in at 
least two ways that suggested its superiority over a more technical interpre-
tation of “statute of limitations.”  First, it was attentive to the recent period 
of historical development and interplay of the concepts of statutes of limita-
tions and statutes of repose.190  A legal dictionary definition attempts to 
capture the formal meaning of a term but may provide only a bare snapshot 
where the meaning is fluctuating in the broader social context and still un-
settled.191  Second, the court’s plain meaning inquiry reflected a realistic 
view of Congress that did not assume congressmembers have law dictionar-
ies in hand as they debate and bargain or that they speak primarily to law-
yers and judges instead of their constituency.192  The common theme here, 
indicative of a public meaning approach, is a flexible responsiveness to the 
public context in which a term was used and to the public audience ad-
dressed during the legislative process.193 
                                                          
 187.  Victoria F. Nourse, Two Kinds of Plain Meaning, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 997, 1000–03 
(2011) (distinguishing between ordinary/popular meaning as “prototypical” meaning that selects 
for the core or best example of a term, and technical/legalist meaning as meaning that selects for 
all examples in the sense of “detach[ing] chunks of text from the statute and . . . hold[ing] them up 
to the light to test their logical extent”).  This Note refers to “ordinary/popular/prototypical” mean-
ing simply as “public” meaning, as Professor Nourse occasionally does as well.  See id. at 1005 
(“The very existence of two kinds of plain meaning calls for a theory concerning when a court 
should apply expert meaning and when it should apply public or prototypical meaning.”). 
 188.  See id. at 1003 (explaining that textualists, associated with “a more restrained view of 
statutory interpretation,” tend to favor legalist meaning in plain meaning analysis and claim “they 
do not ‘add’ meaning to text”). 
 189.  See Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 443 (4th Cir. 2013) (seeking the wider his-
torical context of “statute of limitations” and noting interchangeable uses of this term and “statute 
of repose”). 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  See Nourse, supra note 187, at 1002 (relating a “shell-and-kernel” metaphor in which 
legalist meaning only captures the shell, and portraying legalist meaning also with the quoted 
phrase, “he who sticks to the letter of the law will only stick to its bark”).  
 192.  The Waldburger majority notably eschewed recourse to dictionaries altogether.  See 
Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 442–43 (not consulting a dictionary for consideration of whether § 9658 
is ambiguous). 
 193.  See Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the Superma-
joritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO L.J. 1119, 1132–33 (2011) (pointing 
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Elucidating the Waldburger majority’s reliance on a less narrow vari-
ant of plain meaning analysis helps to strengthen the force of its conclusion.  
The main argument given by the court in support of finding Section 9658 
ambiguous rests on somewhat shaky grounds because it suggests that North 
Carolina’s statute of repose might be subject to preemption by virtue of be-
ing codified with a collection of “statutes of limitations periods.”194  How-
ever, Section 9658 only references “statute of limitations,”195 the singular 
form, and the statute of repose is not really a limitations period “specified in 
the State statute of limitations” pertinent to the plaintiffs’ cause of action.196  
The court even reveals some awareness that its primary argument might 
“seem to be stretching to find ambiguity.”197  Therefore, far from being a 
mere “additional observation,”198 the court’s brief points concerning the 
historical evolution of the statutes of limitations/statutes of repose distinc-
tion formed the basis for a strong argument in favor of the existence of rele-
vant ambiguity. 
Further, although Waldburger reads as though reasonable minds might 
simply disagree on the matter of Section 9658’s ambiguity, placing empha-
sis on a public meaning variant of plain meaning analysis shows why the 
decision is more convincing than other conclusions.  The dissent, for exam-
ple, relied on the technical/legalist meaning from Black’s Law Dictionary to 
argue that “statute of limitations” was sufficiently plain, and so failed to ad-
equately account for the historical element of unclear, shifting meanings 
and for realistic portrayals of how legislators draft their legislative pro-
posals.199  The opposing player in the circuit split, the Fifth Circuit,200 paid 
no heed to the ambiguities of relevant public meanings at the time SARA 
                                                          
out that “[o]rdinary meaning is important in statutory interpretation because members talk to the 
public, their constituents, at least as much as they act as expert legal draftsmen.  Public constitu-
encies increase members’ incentives to use prototypical meanings . . . .  These incentives . . . apply 
even in statutory text.”). 
 194.  Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 442–43 (“First, the ten-year bar is located with the statutes of 
limitations periods in a section titled, ‘Limitations, Other than Real Property.’  As such, it is a lim-
itations period ‘specified in the State statute of limitations or under common law.’”  (citations 
omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1) (2006))). 
 195.  42 U.S.C. § 9658 (a)(1)–(b)(2–3) (emphasis added). 
 196.  Id. § 9658 (a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 197.  Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 443. 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  See supra notes 187–188 and accompanying text.  The dissenting opinion did 
acknowledge that the distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose was at one 
historical point unclear, but went on to state that “[u]sing the dictionary definition of ‘statute of 
limitations’ available to Congress in 1986, it is clear that there is no ambiguity as to the meaning 
of that term at the time § 9658 was enacted.”  Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 448 (Thacker, J., dissent-
ing). 
 200.  See Burlington N. & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Poole Chem. Co., 419 F.3d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 
2005) (concluding “that § 9658 does not preempt the Texas statute of repose”). 
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was passed, and therefore failed to account for the evolution in the actual 
ordinary use of statutes of limitations and statutes of repose.201  As the 
Waldburger holding is not susceptible to the defects of an unduly narrow 
and temporally troubled approach to plain meaning analysis, the Supreme 
Court should affirm. 
2. The Waldburger Majority’s Conclusion That Section 9658 
Preempted North Carolina’s Statute of Repose Avoids Absurd 
Consequences, Unlike a Conclusion Based on Plain Meaning as 
Literal Meaning 
The Waldburger court showed concern with the consequences of 
adopting the facially plain language of Section 9658, although it did not go 
so far as to make an absurdity-based argument.202  The court highlighted the 
internal inconsistency within Section 9658, namely, that it at first includes 
common law limitations periods in the scope of preemption, but elsewhere 
references only a “statute of limitations.”203  This does show inconsistency; 
but, given that Waldburger involves a statutory and not a common law limi-
tation, the inconsistency lacks direct bearing on the facts of this case.204  A 
review of the repose preemption cases decided by several courts in Ala-
bama,205 however, reveals why a conclusion that repose statutes are within 
the preemptive scope of Section 9658 escapes absurd consequences. 
                                                          
 201.  The Burlington court cited cases from 2004 and 1991 to define “statute of repose,” and 
cited cases ranging from 1984–1999 to define “statute of limitations.”  Id. at 362–64.  Only cases 
from 1986 (the year of SARA’s passage) and preceding years, however, would have been useful 
for understanding what Congress had meant by “statute of limitations” in § 9658. 
 202.  The absurdity doctrine provides: “If a given statutory application sharply contradicts 
commonly held social values, then [courts presume] that this absurd result reflects imprecise draft-
ing” and not Congress’s intent.  John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
2387, 2389–90, 2389 n.7 (2003).  “Commonly held social values” can be defined as “a shorthand 
for the array of moral, economic, political, and other values shared by the society in which a legis-
lature operates.”  Id. at 2389 n.7. 
 203.  Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1)(2006) (“[I]f the applicable limitations period for such 
action (as specified in the State statute of limitations or under common law) provides a com-
mencement date which is earlier than . . . .”), with 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(2)(2006) (“The term ‘ap-
plicable limitations period’ means the period specified in a statute of limitations during which a 
civil action . . . may be brought.”), and 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(3) (2006) (“The term ‘commence-
ment date’ means the date specified in a statute of limitations as the beginning of the applicable 
limitations period.”). 
 204.  At least one court that considered whether the FRCD preempted a common law rule of 
repose responded to the inconsistency by recognizing that “courts are discouraged ‘from adopting 
a reading of a statute that renders any part of the statute mere surplusage.’”  Abrams v. Ciba Spe-
cialty Chems. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1236 (S.D. Ala. 2009) (quoting Tug Allie-B, Inc. v. 
United States, 273 F.3d 936, 944 (11th Cir. 2001)). 
 205.  Moore v. Walter Coke, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-1391-SLB, 2012 WL 4731255, at *1, *8 (N.D. 
Ala. Sept. 28, 2012); Abrams, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 1226; Fisher v. Ciba Specialty Chems. Corp., 
No. 03-0566-WS-B, 2007 WL 2995525, at *1, *20 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 11, 2007). 
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The interesting twist in the Alabama repose cases was that they each 
involved a common law rule of repose, rather than a statute of repose.206  
As the Waldburger court noted, the core text of Section 9658 provides for 
preemption of common law limitations periods with commencement dates 
earlier than the FRCD.207  Accordingly, two district courts in Alabama 
found that the state’s common law repose rule was preempted.208  This 
seems like a fair application of the plain meaning rule for Section 9658, 
which specifically references “common law” limitations periods.209  Stat-
utes of repose are not, of course, referenced by Section 9658, which led the 
Fifth Circuit to conclude that the plain meaning of Section 9658 did not 
support preemption.210 
Consider the implications, however, of accepting this argument based 
on facial plain meaning while also accepting—again based on facial plain 
meaning—that Section 9658 includes common law limitations periods: De-
spite the lack of any relevant distinction between repose rules under the 
common law and those codified in statutes, plaintiffs like the Waldburgers 
in states that happened to have common law repose rules could have their 
cases heard, while those in states with statutes of repose would have their 
claims barred.  Even further, plaintiffs like the Waldburgers would have 
their claims barred by a ten-year statute of limitations, while other plaintiffs 
might face a twenty-year (or longer) common law rule of repose yet still be 
able to bring their action.  The stunningly arbitrary character of this out-
come, which clashes roughly with societal expectations of fairness, makes it 
appear absurd that Congress could have intended it.211 
                                                          
 206.  See Moore, 2012 WL 4731255, at *1 (finding that § 9658 “applies to Alabama’s rule of 
repose”); Abrams, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 1231 (“Here, however, there is no statute of repose, but there 
is instead a rule of repose created by Alabama common law.”); Fisher, 2007 WL 2995525, at *14 
(same). 
 207.  42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1). 
 208.  See Moore, 2012 WL 4731255, at *13 (concluding that Alabama’s common law rule of 
repose was subject to preemption by the FRCD); Abrams, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 1229 (same); Fisher, 
2007 WL 2995525, at *20 (same). 
 209.  But see Evans v. Walter Indus., 579 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1364 (N.D. Ala. 2008) (holding 
that § 9658 “does not encompass a rule of repose and, therefore, does not preempt Alabama’s 
twenty-year rule of repose”).  Note, however, that the Evans court must move away from the plain 
meaning of the statute, which refers to common law limitations periods, to reach its conclusion. 
Id. at 1363–64. 
 210.  See supra Part II.D.1. 
 211.  A number of absurdity doctrine cases have involved rejections of the consequences of 
literal meaning that also call to mind this sort of arbitrariness or unfairness.  See, e.g., Den Hartog 
v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1090–91 (10th Cir. 1997) (doubting that Congress could have 
intended the result that employers could invoke the “direct threat” defense under the American 
Disabilities Act against some classes of persons but not others from whom such threat could be 
received); Fitzgerald v. Chrysler Corp., 116 F.3d 225, 226–27 (7th Cir. 1997) (refusing to apply 
RICO warranty fraud liability to a defendant when such warranty would not apply if the defendant 
had not happened to operate through franchise dealers rather than its own dealership). 
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The Waldburger court was attuned to the broader textual context in 
which Congress deployed the term “statute of limitations,” but it did not 
consider the consequences of the common law provision beyond an issue of 
consistency relevant only to common law rules of repose.212  As the “moth-
er of all consequentialist canons,”213 the absurdity prohibition can be con-
troversial for those who wish to stay tightly tethered to the text.  The Wald-
burger majority, however, demonstrated an openness looking toward the 
broader implications of the text and its structure during its plain meaning 
analysis.214  This flexibility guided the court to a finding of preemption, 
which, as the conclusion that sensibly permits the FRCD to replace the 
functional commencement dates of both common law repose rules and stat-
utes of limitations, is the conclusion that should be affirmed by the Supreme 
Court. 
C.  The Waldburger Majority’s Conclusion That Section 9658 
Preempted North Carolina’s Statute of Repose Is the Result 
Recommended by Recourse to Legislative History That Properly 
Emphasizes Principles of Proximity and Specificity 
All sources of legislative history are not created equal.215  The Wald-
burger court did not openly acknowledge this reality, but nonetheless right-
ly drew on the House Conference Report for guidance after establishing the 
textual ambiguity of Section 9568.216  The two main documents that courts 
have relied upon when addressing what legislative history suggests about 
FRCD preemption of statutes of repose are the House Conference Report 
and the Study Group Report.217  The Waldburger dissent used the latter to 
                                                          
 212.  See supra text accompanying note 137. 
 213.  Jane S. Schacter, Text or Consequences?, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1007, 1011 (2011).  
Schacter writes that “[b]y definition, the absurdity doctrine is oriented precisely to avoiding bad 
policy consequences.”  Id. 
 214.  See supra text accompanying note 137. 
 215.  See, e.g., Eric Lane, The Real Politik of Writing and Reading Statutes, 76 BROOK. L. 
REV. 967, 976 (2011) (quoting Judge Nicholas Politan of the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey as claiming that the task of looking at legislative history is “to sift through 
it, determine what is hot stuff, what is good stuff, what is bad stuff . . . and then make a judg-
ment”); Victoria Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the 
Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 73 (2012) (offering the “common sense” view that methods of statutory 
interpretation should “defer[] to Congress’s own rules”); Matthew B. Todd, Avoiding Judicial In-
Activism: The Use of Legislative History to Determine Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 189, 211–13 (2006) (recognizing that most courts reject remarks made 
subsequent to a bill’s passage as offering useful insight into congressional intent, and that state-
ments made by a legislator to an empty house are poor support for what Congress was “thinking”). 
 216.  See Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 443–44 (4th Cir. 2013) (majority opinion) 
(selecting legislative history without discussion of how to select best sources). 
 217.  See, e.g., McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 782–83 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that 
“[t]wo significant items of legislative history referencing this issue” [of what Congress meant by 
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argue that Congress must have been aware of the distinction between stat-
utes of limitations and statutes of repose.218  The introduction of a principle 
of differentiation among the countless types of documents to which courts 
might appeal is needed for an explanation as to why a reliance on the Study 
Group Report is less effective than reliance on the House Conference Re-
port, or other possible sources. 
The most effective uses of legislative history center the principles of 
proximity and specificity because these principles help illuminate Con-
gress’s intent at or near the time a bill was passed and on point to a particu-
lar issue.219  That is, “proximity” is temporal, and proximate legislative his-
tory is that which is nearest in time to the passage of the legislation, but not 
after.220  In the case of FRCD preemption, proximity would recommend ex-
amination of SARA’s legislative history that privileges the House Confer-
ence Report immediately preceding final debate and passage.221  Proximity 
is balanced by the principle of specificity, which refers to a substantive at-
tribute and filters for relevant content.222  Specificity would recommend, 
then, looking at statements relating to the introduction of Section 9658 in 
particular, which first appears in the Report of the Committee on Energy 
and Commerce,223 or to debates involving the provision.224  Significantly, 
these principles suggest that the Study Group Report is highly dubious as a 
source of legislative history for at least two reasons.  First, it does not speak 
to the FRCD provision in particular at all, as this legislative option was not 
its recommendation.225  Second, the Study Group Report is years removed 
in time, as it was submitted in 1982, and SARA was not passed until 
1986.226  The dissent’s assertion that one brief mention in the Study Group 
                                                          
‘statute of limitations’] are the STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 38, and House Conference Re-
port); Burlington N. & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Poole Chem. Co., 419 F.3d 355, 364 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(using the House Conference Report to confirm its conclusion that Congress did not intend to 
preempt the Texas statute of repose at issue). 
 218.  See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 219.  See Nourse, supra 215, at 110–11 (pointing out that bills and understandings of the issues 
they raise can change dramatically over time, and so looking for particular issues raised as close to 
the bill’s passage as possible is most prudent; and, identifying this way of using legislative history 
as reflecting principles of proximity and specificity). 
 220.  Id.; see also Todd, supra note 215, at 211–12. 
 221.  See Nourse, supra note 215, at 98 (“It is the conventional and correct wisdom that, of all 
legislative history ‘apart from the statute itself, [conference committee reports are] the most relia-
ble evidence of congressional’ decisions.” (quoting In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 
F.3d 970, 977 (9th Cir. 1999))). 
 222.  Id. at 97 (describing how copious legislative history resources could be substantially 
thinned by picking out where a “key statutory term” [or provision] was introduced). 
 223.  HOUSE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 44, at 1797–98.  
 224.  131 CONG. REC. 11547–71 (1985) [hereinafter House Debate]. 
 225. STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 38, at 255–56. 
 226.  See supra Part II.A.   
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Report of “statute of repose” as something distinct from “statute of limita-
tions” was enough to effectively put Congress “on notice”227 seems, then, a 
rare and rather too-charitable portrayal of congressmembers’ long-term 
memory capacities. 
Beyond showing why appeals to the Study Group Report are uncon-
vincing, however, attention to specificity in particular points to an over-
looked but telling House debate.228  Representative Barney Frank attempted 
to insert a federal cause of action provision for toxic tort plaintiffs, but did 
not receive the votes.229  Statements from legislators who blocked the pro-
vision pointed to the FRCD to explain why a federal cause of action was an 
unnecessary measure for addressing the problem of claims barred due to the 
long latency periods of certain injuries.230  The FRCD provision already in 
the draft bill was understood to mean that “all persons, regardless of which 
State they live in, will be able to sue for damages when they know they 
have been damaged,”231 and so the FRCD “already takes care of any prob-
lems that anyone from any State might have by having confusion as to how 
long he has or she has in which to bring a cause of action.”232  The legisla-
tive history of Section  9658 suggests, then, that the FRCD was indeed in-
tended to address various limitations periods that might bar plaintiffs’ ac-
tions. 
Another sense in which looking to the principle of specificity in addi-
tion to proximity strengthens the force of the court’s decision is that this 
permits more of the justificatory burden behind the court’s holding to be 
shifted away from its reliance on the remedial purpose canon.233  The reme-
dial purpose canon has been problematized, especially by positivist political 
theory and the rise of social choice theory, which both challenge the notion 
of Congress having one identifiable “intent.”234  Rather, battles are won and 
lost and compromises struck.235  Legislative history from the House debate 
shows, however, the status of both SARA and the FRCD provision as com-
                                                          
 227.  Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 452 (4th Cir. 2013) (Thacker, J., dissenting). 
 228.  See House Debate, supra note 224, at 4320–39. 
 229.  Id. at 4338–39. 
 230.  Id. at 4323–31. 
 231.  Id. at 4323 (statement by Rep. Glickman). 
 232.  Id. at 4324 (statement by Rep. Breaux). 
 233.  The Waldburger court appealed to the remedial purpose canon, which instructs a liberal 
standard of construction when the statute at issue is remedial.  See supra notes 140–142 and ac-
companying text. 
 234.  See Manning, supra note 202, at 2390 (“[T]he legislative process is simply too complex 
and too opaque to permit judges to get inside Congress’s ‘mind.’”). 
 235.  See id. at 2410 (“[B]ecause legislation is often the product of compromise, judges cannot 
reliably use idealized background legislative intent . . . .”). 
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promise legislation,236 thus countering any claims of an inaccurate depiction 
of the legislative process.  Further, and significantly, the Supreme Court has 
indicated its reluctance to broadly interpret CERCLA through appeal to the 
remedial purpose canon, which is a common interpretive strategy in lower 
courts.237  Yet as the Waldburger holding has both proximate and specific 
legislative history to support it, the Supreme Court has good reason to af-
firm. 
D.  The Challenge of the General Presumption Against Preemption 
Can Be Met Due to the Anomalous Features of the FRCD 
The Waldburger court largely ignores the relevance of concerns about 
federalism in its decision,238 but the dissent and prior courts struggling with 
FRCD preemption have acknowledged the existence of and challenge pre-
sented by the presumption against preemption.239  The primary reason for 
the presumption against preemption is to protect the “sphere of sovereign-
ty” belonging to the states.240  As Judge Thacker points out in her dissent, 
the presumption against preemption is most relevant in “fields the states 
traditionally regulate,”241 and states surely typically regulate the creation of 
substantive rights protecting against state law liability.242  Another im-
portant and much more recently articulated reason to appreciate the pre-
sumption is the worry that preemption will bar recourse to state liability re-
gimes without providing federal remedies in their stead.243  The 
                                                          
 236.  See House Debate, supra note 224, at 4323 (statement by Rep. Glickman recognizing that 
SARA was compromise legislation and that the FRCD is an option between the federal cause of 
action and the barring of plaintiffs’ claims). 
 237.  “[A]lthough the vast array of lower court decisions on CERCLA almost invariably broad-
ly interpret CERCLA in light of the broad remedial purposes that Congress had in mind, the Su-
preme Court ‘has in almost every CERCLA case it has gotten, narrowly interpreted the statute, 
most recently in 2009 in [Burlington N. & Santa Fe R.R. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599 (2009)].’”  
Perry Cooper, SCOTUS Likely to Reverse 4th Circuit Ruling in CERCLA Preemption Case, Panel-
ists Say, BNA SNAPSHOT (Feb. 10, 2014) (quoting Professor Robert Percival, University of Mary-
land Francis King Carey School of Law). 
 238.  Only the dissent addresses the presumption against preemption.  See Waldburger v. CTS 
Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 453 (4th Cir. 2013) (Thacker, J., dissenting). 
 239.  See id.; Lee v. CSX Transp., Inc., 958 So.2d 578, 583 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (assert-
ing that the remedial purpose canon is unpersuasive with regard to FRCD preemption because the 
FRCD “preempts state law within a field traditionally occupied by the states” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 240.  See Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against 
Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 260 (explaining how federal legisla-
tion is regarded as “constitutionally suspect where it intrudes into areas of traditional state regula-
tion” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 241.  Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 453 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 242.  Id. 
 243.  See Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1501, 1558 (2009) (“[T]here appears to be a growing trend toward using principles 
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presumption is thus important both for its protection of states’ traditionally 
occupied fields and protection of some plaintiffs’ very access to justice. 
Recognizing the general significance of the presumption against 
preemption does not necessitate a different conclusion than FRCD preemp-
tion of state statutes of repose because the FRCD provision is unique in 
ways that weaken the presumption’s applicability.  Its anomalous quality is 
that it is federal law that preempts certain state laws, but only so that sub-
stantive state law claims may be brought by the plaintiffs.244  This means 
that CERCLA’s FRCD provision is designed to leave state tort law in-
tact.245  Further, it only preempts state laws where they differ from the con-
tent of the FRCD, leaving in place discovery-based limitations with the 
same effect.246  This reflects Congress’s restraint of its preemptive legisla-
tion potential.247  Although Section 9658 creates national uniformity of 
commencement dates for tort actions within its scope, its preemptive impact 
does not raise the same concerns about protecting state law as would 
preemption of the tort actions themselves, or preemptive legislation broader 
in scope than necessary to achieve Congress’s purpose.248 
Indeed, more accurately stated, the “worry” about the impact of FRCD 
preemption on states’ powers is that state courts would have to hear more 
actions brought under state law than the state judged it should249—a prob-
lem of too much application of state law.  Consequently, plaintiffs’ access 
to justice has been increased rather than taken away by preemption.250  
Thus, the court rightly refused, and remained consistent with its more con-
textually aware approach to statutory interpretation,251 to treat the presump-
                                                          
of federal constitutional law to limit the ability of states to grant their citizens the right to obtain 
private redress for harm under tort law.”). 
 244.  42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1) (2006) (providing that “[i]n the case of any action brought under 
State law for” certain tort claims involving hazardous substances, the FRCD preempts only any 
applicable commencement dates). 
 245.  See House Debate, supra note 224, at 4332 (statement by Rep. McCollum explaining that 
a federal cause of action should not be created, but that Congress should “[l]et the State laws ap-
ply”). 
 246.  See supra text accompanying notes 49–50. 
 247.  Alan Untereiner, The Defense of Preemption: A View from the Trenches, 84 TUL. L. REV. 
1257, 1269 (2010) (citing as one example of safeguards that show that Congress “is perfectly able 
to accommodate federalism concerns in crafting preemptive federal legislation” that “Congress 
often elects only to preempt state and local laws that are different from federal law, thus leaving 
intact state and local laws that are identical or substantially similar to federal mandates”). 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  See Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 453 (4th Cir. 2013) (Thacker, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that federalism concerns are weighty where preemption would deprive a state of its 
ability “to create a substantive right to be free from liability under its own state tort law”). 
 250.  See id. at 445 (majority opinion) (“In so holding, we simply further Congress’s intent that 
victims of toxic waste not be hindered in their attempts to hold accountable those who have strewn 
such waste on their land.”). 
 251.  See supra Part IV.A. 
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tion against preemption as a hard and fast rule.  The federalism concerns as-
sociated with preemption merit serious consideration, but the presumption 
against preemption should not be dispositive in the case of the FRCD.  A 
potential Supreme Court finding of preemption need not, then, be under-
mined by the presumption against preemption. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Waldburger v. CTS Corporation, the Fourth Circuit determined that 
CERCLA Section 9658 preempted North Carolina’s ten-year statute of re-
pose for real property.252  Although the court’s reasoning might have been 
helpfully clarified and expanded, as this Note has sought to do, the Wald-
burger decision is correct for three main reasons.253  First, it is supported by 
a variant of plain meaning analysis that searches for “public” versus tech-
nical or legalist meaning and avoids absurdity.254  Second, it resulted from 
an emphasis on the principles of proximity and specificity where legislative 
history is consulted for guidance.255  Finally, the presumption against 
preemption does not undermine the decision, as the FRCD is a singular 
provision regarding which the presumption has far less weight.256  The Su-
preme Court should therefore affirm Waldburger, and by so doing, effec-
tively secure access to justice for plaintiffs injured by long-latency, diffi-
cult-to-detect personal injury and property damages. 
                                                          
 252.  Waldburger, 723 F.3d at 438. 
 253.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 254.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 255.  See supra Part IV.C. 
 256.  See supra Part IV.D. 
